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BEING PRAGMATIC ABOUT FORENSIC 
LINGUISTICS 
Edward K. Cheng* 
If my late colleague Margaret Berger taught me anything 
about evidence, it was that the field seldom yields easy answers. 
After all, law is necessarily a pragmatic discipline, especially 
when it comes to matters of proof. Courts must make their best 
decisions given the available evidence. They have neither the 
luxury of waiting for better, nor the ability to conjure up, 
evidence (or new technologies) that they wished they had. 
Scholars, by contrast, are naturally attracted to the ideal, 
sometimes like moths to a flame. Ideals reflect the values and 
commitments of our society, and they provide the goals that 
inspire and guide research. But when assessing a new field like 
forensic linguistics as a legal academic, one needs to carefully 
separate the ideal from the pragmatic. For when it comes to real 
cases, evidence law can ill afford to allow the perfect to be the 
enemy of the good. 
Bearing this admonition firmly in mind, this article aims to 
provide some legal context to the Authorship Attribution 
Workshop (“conference”). In particular, I want to offer some 
pragmatic observations on what courts will likely demand of 
forensic linguistics experts1 and tentatively suggest what the field 
should aspire to in both the short and long run. 
                                                          
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School; Ph.D. Candidate, Department of 
Statistics, Columbia University. Thanks to Larry Solan for organizing this 
remarkably interdisciplinary conference and to Dashiell Renaud for research 
assistance. 
1 While “forensic linguistics” may encompass a broader set of 
techniques, I will use the term synonymously with the use of linguistic 
methods for purposes of attributing authorship, the focus of the conference. 
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I. DAUBERT 
No discussion of scientific evidence—at least no discussion 
of scientific evidence in the United States—can begin without 
referencing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals.2 Daubert 
establishes a five-factor test for the admissibility of scientific 
evidence: i) falsifiability and testing; ii) publication and peer 
review; iii) error rates; iv) standards; and v) general 
acceptance.3 Unfortunately, applying these factors to many of the 
forensic linguistic methods presented at this conference 
immediately raises concerns. The methods do not have rigid 
procedures that have been tested or have known error rates. 
Excepting the contributions in this issue of the Journal of Law 
and Policy, few have ever been published. And, almost by 
definition, since forensic linguistics is an emerging field, many 
techniques lack general acceptance. 
The principal issue is not that forensic linguistic methods are 
junk. Rather, the problem is that forensic linguistic methods often 
change from one case to another to account for case-specific 
contours: Malcolm Coulthard’s case study involved selecting 
certain misspellings and word choices made over e-mail,4 while 
Tim Grant’s study explored the peculiar grammar of text 
messaging.5 The result is a “moving target,” and while moving 
targets are not necessarily bad as a theoretical matter, they are a 
big problem for the Daubert test, which envisions standardized, 
broadly applicable (and broadly applied) techniques. 
Does this mismatch spell doom for the field? Will forensic 
linguists thus inevitably face widespread opposition and 
exclusion by judges? Emphatically no. As many in the scientific 
evidence community have long observed, Daubert in practice 
fundamentally differs from Daubert in theory. In real life, courts 
often treat the Daubert factors more as incantation than as actual 
                                                          
2 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
3 See id. at 593–94.  
4 Malcolm Coulthard, On Admissible Linguistic Evidence, 21 J.L. & 
POL’Y 441 (2013). 
5 Tim Grant, TXT 4N6: Method, Consistency, and Distinctiveness in the 
Analysis of SMS Text Messages, 21 J.L. & POL’Y 467 (2013). 
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requirements.6 What they really impose is an impressionistic 
type of scrutiny, giving the expert testimony a “hard look” for 
intellectual rigor, but nothing more.  
Courts have gravitated toward hard-look scrutiny not out of 
laziness or ignorance7 but out of pragmatism. The Daubert case 
itself arose in the pharmaceutical context, where large datasets, 
standardized treatments, and statistical studies reign. What the 
Daubert test demands is thus perfectly reasonable in that context. 
In other contexts, however, useful expertise exists in the absence 
of such data. For example, like forensic linguists, accident 
reconstruction experts also customize their analyses based on case 
specifics. This customization again means little standardization or 
statistical justification. Yet, courts have regularly admitted 
reconstruction experts under hard-look review.8 
The contours of this hard-look test seem to boil down to 
three somewhat related inquires. First, is the expert overselling 
the power of his technique? Courts display little patience with 
expert grandstanding, strongly preferring ones who carefully 
delineate what their techniques can and cannot do.9 Second, does 
the expert provide a rational explanation for how the technique 
works? Daubert is in many ways an emphatic rejection of ipse 
dixit or say-so testimony.10 Even though jurors lack technical 
expertise, Daubert tasks them with engaged, reasoned, critical 
decision making. Blind deference to the authority of a well-
                                                          
6 Cf. 5 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE 
LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 43:10, at 782 (2012) (“As a 
result, the Daubert factors have become something akin to incantation in the 
structural engineering context, rather than a roadmap for rigorous inquiry.”). 
7 But see Sophia I. Gatowski et al., Asking the Gatekeepers: A National 
Survey of Judges on Judging Expert Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 25 
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 433, 454–55 (2001) (suggesting that many state court 
judges may not fully understand the Daubert factors). 
8 See FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 6, § 44:10, at 810 (“[C]ourts take a 
pragmatic view, admitting [accident reconstruction] testimony even when 
testing is absent or is otherwise imperfect or flawed.”). 
9 See id. §§ 45:4–7 (discussing flaws in expert economic analyses). 
10 Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997) (“[N]othing in 
either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to 
admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by the ipse 
dixit of the expert.”).  
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credentialed expert simply will not do.11 Finally, is the expert 
willing to acknowledge and address criticisms of his technique? 
Overdefensiveness or blithely ignoring well-founded objections 
often betrays a certain lack of understanding, another worthy 
ground for exclusion.12  
Viewed in this light, there is little surprise that courts have 
generally permitted the linguists at this conference to testify in 
court,13 and this trend will likely continue. At least within this 
hand-picked subpopulation, the experts do not oversell their wares 
and carefully circumscribe the conditions under which their 
methods apply. They provide reasoned explanations, and I suppose 
the mere fact of their attendance at this conference demonstrates a 
profound commitment to taking objections seriously. 
II. A (LONG-TERM) WISH LIST 
As argued above, courts are likely to admit forensic 
linguistics as it currently stands. But presumably, this 
conference’s focus is not merely this basic doctrinal question. 
Rather, Larry Solan’s vision was to consider what forensic 
linguistics might become and how the field might best aid the 
legal system.14 In this aspirational vein, let us therefore consider 
                                                          
11 See generally Ronald J. Allen & Joseph S. Miller, The Common Law 
Theory of Experts: Deference or Education?, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 1131 (1993) 
(discussing whether the role of experts is to educate the jury or to arrive at 
conclusions to which a jury defers). 
12 Cf. FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 6, § 43:14, at 786–87 (discussing the 
courts’ use of “robustness tests,” which test how well an expert addresses 
alternative theories or contrary evidence, in the structural engineering 
context). 
13 Perhaps the most striking example is Carole Chaski, who reports 
having been allowed to testify in a Frye state even after noting repeatedly that 
her method was experimental and still under development, a condition clearly 
at odds with her methods being “generally accepted”—the sole criterion for 
admissibility under a Frye test. See Carole Chaski, Best Practices and 
Admissibility of Forensic Author Identification, 21 J.L. & POL’Y 333, 358 
(2013). The suspicion, naturally, is that even in Frye jurisdictions, what 
matters to courts is not the headcount associated with a method but the 
intellectual rigor of the method as probed by the hard-look test. 
14 Lawrence Solan, Intuition Versus Algorithm: The Case of Forensic 
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a “wish list” of attributes that the law might want from the field. 
In an ideal world, we would probably like forensic linguistic 
analysis to have: 
 a widely adopted, predefined algorithm (preferably 
automated); 
 a large, random sample of known exemplars 
(preferably subclassified by topic and genre); and 
 a well-understood theoretical underpinning. 
These goals are not my brainchild but have been implicit in 
many comments, criticisms, caveats, and apologies heard 
throughout this conference. We all seem to wish that forensic 
linguistics had fewer ad hoc, case-specific methods so that we 
could have more rigorous testing and known error rates. We 
wish that we had a larger and more detailed set of training data 
so that we could be more confident about external validity. And 
finally, the linguists, although perhaps not the computational 
ones, would feel more comfortable if the methods and results 
were better rooted in linguistic theory. 
A moment’s reflection suggests the loftiness of these goals. 
Only one forensic method arguably satisfies them all—DNA. 
DNA has a widely adopted, predefined, largely automated 
algorithm; a large, random sample of known exemplars; and a 
well-understood theoretical underpinning. That is not to say that 
its history and development were without controversy,15 but that 
is where matters stand today. No other forensic field can make 
such claims. 
Juxtaposed to DNA, forensic linguistics clearly has a long 
way to go. Nearly all of the procedures and algorithms 
presented at this conference involve some degree of ad hoc 
expert tweaking and customization, particularly those used for 
short writing samples. The computational procedures that 
                                                          
Authorship Attribution, 21 J.L. & POL’Y 551 (2013). 
15 For example, forensic DNA evidence generated two National Academy 
of Sciences reports in rapid succession. The first, published in 1992, failed to 
resolve controversies that were later largely put to rest in the second, 
published in 1996. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE EVALUATION OF 
FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE 10–11 (1996) (“[W]e agree with many 
recommendations of the earlier [report] but disagree with others.”). 
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involve less tweaking ideally require a large, random sample of 
exemplars that currently does not exist. And in almost all cases, 
the theoretical underpinning for the results is opaque. For 
example, participants offered some off-the-cuff rationales for 
why n-grams16 or the other machine learning methods work, but 
no one really understands what is going on. 
These ultimate goals are surely daunting, but we should be 
encouraged that the leaders in the forensic linguistics community 
have set their sights correctly on the prize. 
III. SHORT-TERM ASPIRATIONS 
With the long-term goals set, let us consider what courts 
might demand from forensic linguistics in the short term. As I 
mentioned in the introduction, the legal system must be more 
pragmatic in the short term, so what exactly should it demand? 
In this context, Daubert hard-look review in conjunction with 
the other evidentiary rules provides a convenient short-term 
checklist for forensic linguists. 
1. The testimony must add value. This requirement is at the 
heart of the relevance standard established by Rule 40117 and the 
“help the trier of fact” standard governing experts under Rule 
702.18 At the very minimum, forensic linguists should be more 
than highly credentialed window dressing on common sense. 
They must add substantive value. 
This requirement appears easily met, especially when the 
expert moves beyond obvious identifying features such as 
misspellings or unusual word choices. For example, techniques 
exploiting syntactic structure, choice of function words or 
grammar, or n-grams clearly represent ideas beyond the ken of 
the average (or even sophisticated) juror. 
                                                          
16 An n-gram is a sequence of n adjacent items—words, phrases, or 
characters—from a given text, forming the basis for analysis.  
17 FED. R. EVID. 401. 
18 FED. R. EVID. 702(a) (“A witness who is qualified as an expert . . . 
may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if: (a) the expert’s 
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact 
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue . . . .”). 
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2. The testimony must enlighten more than distort or confuse. 
This second requirement has both evidentiary and statistical 
inspirations. Evidentiarily speaking, Rule 403 requires that the 
probative value of evidence not be substantially outweighed by 
its potential for unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury.19 Statistically speaking, George Box’s well-
known maxim sums up the problem in a nutshell: “[A]ll models 
are wrong, but some are useful.”20  
On this score, somewhat counterintuitively, the trend toward 
quantitative and statistical measures may be more worrisome 
than more traditional, off-the-cuff qualitative methods. To be 
sure, as Jay Koehler notes, qualitative methods present hazards 
through loaded and vague words like “match” and 
“consistent.”21 But jurors are at least more comfortable weighing 
that kind of evidence, and attorneys educated about these issues 
can effectively attack them.  
Statistical measures of linguistic similarity are another 
matter. Statistical methods always have underlying assumptions 
and potential problems, and asking jurors (or even opposing 
counsel) to ferret out the distortions created by flawed models is 
unrealistic. Unless the method is so well-trodden and well-
accepted that a jury can essentially use its results uncritically, I 
worry that statistical models in this context may distort more 
than illuminate.  
3. The testimony must be sufficiently transparent to permit 
reasoned decision making. This third requirement originates 
from Daubert’s hard-look test, as well as Rule 702’s demand 
that a conclusion not rest solely on the ipse dixit of an expert.22  
All of the experts at this conference would presumably meet 
this criterion with ease, since they have all cogently explained 
and defended their methods. I can envision two instances, 
however, in which forensic linguistic testimony could run afoul 
                                                          
19 FED. R. EVID. 403. 
20 GEORGE E.P. BOX & NORMAN R. DRAPER, EMPIRICAL MODEL-
BUILDING AND RESPONSE SURFACES 424 (1987). 
21 Jonathan J. Koehler, Linguistic Confusion in Court: Evidence from the 
Forensic Sciences, 21 J.L. & POL’Y 515, 534 (2013). 
22 FED. R. EVID. 702; see also Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 
146 (1997).  
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of this requirement. The first is the purely impressionistic 
linguist, who relies solely on his or her “training and 
experience.” Lest this example seem like a straw man, let me 
note that authentication attempts in other fields frequently 
proceed along these lines. For example, art experts studying the 
Getty kouros reported feeling an inexplicable revulsion upon 
first seeing the statue, and these gut feelings often provided a 
foundation for their assessment that the statue was a fake.23 Such 
intuitions are surely not nonsense, and arguably the legal system 
should prefer an art expert’s opinion over the average juror’s, 
but Daubert makes clear that ipse dixit, “blink”-type testimony 
does not make the cut.24  
The second potentially problematic instance is where a 
machine-learning algorithm arrives at an empirically successful 
identification rule (i.e., high accuracy), but researchers have 
little idea why it works as a matter of substantive theory.25 With 
its emphasis on predictive accuracy over interpretability, 
machine learning tends toward such black boxes, and while I 
personally sympathize with the approach, the legal system with 
its emphasis on reasoned decision making typically does not.  
4. The method must have some proven empirical validity. 
This final requirement is based again on the text of Rule 70226 
but may be the most difficult short-term aspiration for the field. 
The sine qua non of empirical validity is testing. For some of 
the data-intensive, quantitative methods presented at this 
conference, a focus on testing is practically inherent. But 
                                                          
23 Georgios Dontas, The Getty Kouros: A Look at Its Artistic Defects and 
Incongruities, in THE GETTY KOUROS COLLOQUIUM 37, 37 (Angeliki Kokkou 
ed., Alex Doumas trans., 1993) (“In the controversy regarding the 
authenticity of the Getty kouros a factor that must be taken into account is, in 
my opinion, the unfavourable feeling it arouses at the very first glance.”); see 
also MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK 3–8 (2005) (discussing the Getty kouros). 
24 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588–89 (1993). 
25 See generally Leo Breiman, Statistical Modeling: The Two Cultures, 
16 STAT. SCI. 199 (2001) (discussing the two cultures of statistics: one 
focused on explanation, and the other on prediction). 
26 FED. R. EVID. 702 (“A witness who is qualified as an expert . . . may 
testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if: . . . (c) the testimony is the 
product of reliable principles and methods . . . .”). 
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methods such as those proposed by Coulthard27 or Grant,28 which 
are more qualitative, subjective, or case-specific, will require 
experts to embrace proficiency testing and out-of-sample testing 
more affirmatively.  
For qualitative linguistic experts, courts should demand 
proficiency testing—tests of ability involving known problems 
given under blinded conditions.29 Such testing is undoubtedly no 
fun for the experts involved. The experts open themselves up to 
attack if the testing turns out badly, and the risk of endangering 
a lucrative line of business creates substantial disincentives to 
participate. Experts will thus require judicial prodding, for 
without such information about accuracy rates, jurors cannot 
assess the probative value of an expert’s conclusions. 
For case-customized models, any reported accuracy rates 
must be out-of-sample accuracy rates. Constructing models that 
merely fit the data on hand is one thing; successfully predicting 
future data is an entirely different matter. Tailoring methods or 
models to a specific case is a time-honored recipe for creating 
overfitted models, which explain the current dataset well but 
handle future datasets poorly. To get proper accuracy rates, 
researchers must divide their dataset into training and testing 
sets. Models should be developed only with the training set, and 
validation should be done only with the separate testing set. 
Some of the conference papers used out-of-sample testing, while 
others either did not or were unclear.30  
Finally, part and parcel of testing is the establishment of 
standardized procedures. As the forensic linguistics field 
matures, it will have to sacrifice some of its flexibility for 
                                                          
27 Coulthard, supra note 4. 
28 Grant, supra note 5. 
29 Proficiency testing has been proposed as the solution to Daubert in 
other contexts involving subjective, expert-dependent determinations, such as 
fingerprints. E.g., Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Courts, the NAS, and the Future 
of Forensic Science, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 1209, 1217–33 (2009).  
30 E.g., Shlomo Argamon & Moshe Koppel, A Systemic Functional 
Approach to Automated Authorship Analysis, 21 J.L. & POL’Y 299, 313 tbl.1 
(2013) (uses cross-validation); Chaski, supra note 13, at 353 tbl.3 (uses 
cross-validation); Coulthard, supra note 4 (does not use cross validation); 
Grant, supra note 5 (does not use cross-validation). 
550 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
standardization, both across cases and ultimately across experts. 
Standardization of the feature set used in forensic linguistic 
analysis is imperative if we are to have established error rates. It 
is also the only way to avoid confirmation bias. Without a 
predefined algorithm, an expert runs the significant risk of 
preferencing aspects that confirm her initial hypothesis over 
those that disprove it.31 
Going forward, the challenge for forensic linguists will be to 
develop a method that relies less on the expertise of the 
individual linguist—at least on an everyday basis. The heavy 
lifting in developing an authorship attribution technique should 
occur in the lab, long before it is applied in a legal case. By the 
time it is applied for legal consequence, the application of the 
method should be largely mechanical. 
CONCLUSION 
Ours is an extremely exciting time for forensic linguistics. 
The field faces profound challenges in its attempt to meet the 
ideals and goals set by Daubert, and much work remains to be 
done. Yet, with so many motivated and intellectually engaged 
scholars and researchers, we can be very hopeful that progress 
will be steadily made. 
More broadly, as a legal observer, I am curious to see how 
the field of forensic linguistics ultimately develops. Unlike most 
forensic fields, which arose long before the invention of DNA 
typing and the decision in Daubert, forensic linguistics will 
blossom within a modern scientific evidence framework. It will 
thus provide a unique opportunity to observe how the various 
actors and modern incentives interact. More importantly, it will 
help evidence scholars determine whether all the trouble 
collectively known as Daubert is really worth the candle. 
                                                          
31 In this context, I am reminded of the modus operandi arguments made 
by the prosecution in United States v. Trenkler, 61 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 1995), a 
case involving the purported “signature” of a bomber. The prosecution 
pointed to several common bomb parts in its argument that two bombs were 
constructed by the defendant. The dissent rightly wondered why one should 
emphasize the similarities between the two bombs rather than several 
significant dissimilarities. Id. at 64 (Torruella, J., dissenting). 
